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 Investigating Portugal, Salazar
 and the New State: the Work
 of the Irish Legation in Lisbon,
 1942-1945
 FILIPE RIBEIRO DE MENESES
 'I leave Portugal with a definite opinion that the present regime will not last.' Thus
 wrote Colm O'Donovan, the first Irish charg? d'affaires in Lisbon, on 22 February
 1945, after a stay of three years in the Portuguese capital. O'Donovan's mission
 represented the first continuous examination of Portuguese politics and society by
 an Irish observer since the creation of the Irish Free State. His predictions regarding
 the future of Antonio Oliveira Salazar's New State were, of course, far from correct.
 Marcelo Caetano, Salazar's successor, would only be toppled from power in 1974
 after twelve years of an unpopular, expensive, and seemingly unwinnable colonial
 conflict. Nevertheless, that an Irish official observer could write of Salazar's
 imminent demise with some confidence means that a revolution in the way the
 New State was considered in Dublin had taken place as a result of the establishment
 of a legation in Lisbon. It was not Salazar's political skill or talent that was being
 questioned by O'Donovan, whose admiration for the dictator, untroubled by the
 treatment of Salazar's political opponents, was expressed often throughout his stay.
 Rather, it was the practical workings of the nominally corporative regime over
 which Salazar presided, and which had aroused great interest in Ireland, that led
 O'Donovan to his pessimistic conclusion: 'I have heard on many sides that unless a
 peaceful change-over can be brought about in the near future there will inevitably
 be a very violent revolution in the country.'
 The purpose of this article is to trace the evolution of Irish diplomats' growing
 doubts about the effectiveness and relative worth of the New State's allegedly
 innovative corporative arrangements. While their confidence in the ability of
 Salazar to lead his country remained intact, O'Donovan and his colleagues clearly
 feared that the New State, so often described as a model for Ireland's future, might
 in fact represent a dead-end fatal to Salazar's ambitions. This is of interest because
 Irish diplomats, as we shall see, were observing events in Portugal with a special
 interest not shared by their colleagues in other legations and embassies. Although
 the majority of Irish diplomats were not impressed by the merits of the authoritarian
 regimes which had appeared in the 1920s and 1930s,1 those posted to Portugal were
 1 See, for example, Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1948 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1988),
 23, 47
 Contemporary European History, II, 3 (2002), pp. 391-408 ? 2002 Cambridge University Press
 DOI:10.1017/S096077730200303X Printed in the United Kingdom
This content downloaded from 78.18.65.11 on Tue, 19 May 2020 11:11:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 392  Contemporary European History
 considering the positive and negative characteristics of a new political system whose
 emulation many in Ireland defended at a time when Germany's defeat was by no
 means a certainty, so that the fate of parliamentary democracies in Europe still hung
 in the balance: if Germany won the war would not a corporative regime like that of
 Portugal, with its obvious emphasis on a rejection of the class struggle and of party
 politics, and on a non-aggressive nationalism, provide a better platform for relations
 with a triumphant Hitler? This, of course, is not to argue that Eamon de Valera and
 his Fianna Fail government wanted to convert Ireland into a replica of Salazar's
 New State, but merely to suggest that they wanted to keep abreast of the existing
 alternatives to parliamentary democracy at a critical and unique moment in
 European history.
 An Irish legation was opened in Lisbon in the winter of 1941-2 because of the
 pivotal role assumed by the Portuguese capital during the course of the Second
 World War. Lisbon became a thoroughfare for all those trying to escape a Nazi
 dominated Europe, as well as for information and supplies vital for the preservation
 of Ireland's neutrality. Moreover, Portugal was the scene of an intense propaganda
 struggle closely monitored by the rest of the world, and was thus an apt setting for
 the laying out of Ireland's diplomatic position. In the words of the Irish Times,
 Lisbon had become by 1941 'the hub of the Western Universe'.2 Opening a new
 diplomatic mission represented a serious effort for Ireland's undermanned diplomatic
 service, but it became clear after the fall of France that an official presence in Lisbon
 was essential. Spain, which had long monopolised Irish interests in the Iberian
 Peninsula, was too closely identified with the Axis powers (which it might join at
 any moment) for the Irish mission in Madrid to act with freedom ? and there was
 little to learn from the Francoist state, whose legitimacy derived exclusively from
 military might. The key role played by Lisbon in Ireland's diplomacy did not last,
 however, beyond the end of the conflict. After O'Donovan, Lisbon was to receive a
 full charg? d'affaires only in 1948, despite persistent Portuguese entreaties for a
 replacement (conversely, a Portuguese legation in Dublin, although created by
 decree in 1942, was only manned in 1946).3 Most of O'Donovan's efforts in Lisbon
 were directed precisely towards immediate, and vital, ends: supervising the loading
 of essential goods on ships bound for Ireland, attempting to purchase ships for Irish
 Shipping Ltd, looking after the wellbeing of Irish nationals in Portugal, and
 explaining to the world, through the Portuguese press, the principles upon which
 Irish neutrality, much maligned by Great Britain and the United States, rested.4 It
 2 Irish Times, 23 Oct. 1941.
 3 Thus, for example, the Portuguese charg? d'affaires in Dublin, Antero Carreiro de Freitas,
 explained to his minister, on 13 May 1946, that he had twice asked who would replace Cornelius C.
 Cremin (who was not a full charg? d'affaires), being told that the Irish legation would remain in the care
 of its secretary. Freitas stressed the manpower problems of the Irish diplomatic corps, committed to new
 legations in Sweden and Australia and to the upgraded embassy in the Vatican. Carrero de Freitas to
 Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros (MNE), 13 May 1946, Mi96, MNE, Lisbon.
 4 Two articles in the Irish Times provide a brief description of O'Donovan's 'interesting career':
 According to the first, 'as a young man, Mr. O'Donovan took part in the fight for Irish independence.
 When the Treaty was signed he was sent to Brussels as Consul for Ireland, among the first appointments
 made by Mr. Cosgrave's Government. Later he went to Germany, and then to the Holy See. When in
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 was hard for many pro-British Portuguese to understand how Ireland, as a member
 of the Commonwealth, could remain neutral at a time when Britain was fighting for
 its life;5 O'Donovan had to use contacts in the influential Catholic press and the
 Portuguese propaganda service to make sure that Ireland's position was explained
 and respected in the Lisbon press.6
 Beyond these crucial tasks, however, O'Donovan was expected to observe and
 comment on the workings of the New State, inaugurated by Salazar when he rose
 to the position of President of the Council of Ministers in 1932, and enshrined in
 the Constitution of 1933. This nominally corporative regime was frequently
 described in Ireland as a model for a new, socially progressive, and intrinsically
 Christian style of politics at a time when parliamentary democracy was clearly on
 the retreat across Europe. Numerous glowing articles on Salazar and the New State
 appeared regularly in conservative and religious Irish publications throughout the
 1930s and well into the Second World War. In no other democracy in Europe was
 Salazar as idolised as in Ireland, where a corporative (or, in Irish political language,
 vocational) movement constituted a powerful lobby which questioned the parlia
 mentary nature of Ireland ? and which, because of its popularity in Catholic circles,
 could not be ignored or suppressed by de Valera.7 The possibility of a German
 victory rendered this lobby's message all the more important. If Ireland had to
 change into a regime acceptable in the eyes of Berlin, would the New State, created
 by a devoutly Catholic professor, who had restored order to an ungovernable
 country, not provide the most suitable alternative? One Irish admirer of Salazar was
 Richard S. Devane, a Jesuit, who wrote of Salazar that 'he first attacked the
 philosophic foundations of the paganized liberal state and replaced them by setting
 down and firmly fixing the Christian principles that underlie the New State'8 before
 concluding that Salazar was indeed 'the Saviour of Portugal ? the Saviour of the
 Church, the Saviour of the State, the Saviour of his people'.9 Michael Derrick, who
 contributed a piece on Portugal to the October 1937 issue of the Dublin Review, was
 another New State enthusiast: 'To all acquainted in any way with the history of
 Portugal during the past century, his work must seem almost incredible; and to all
 Rome he made many friends, among them Count Ciano . . . with whom he played golf in pre-war
 days.' Irish Times, 8 Nov. 1941. The other article pointed out the importance of O'Donovan's
 connections: his brother was commissioner for County Dublin and his brother-in-law was governor of
 the Central Bank. Irish Times, 6 Nov. 1941.
 5 It seems that Salazar himself was amazed by de Valera's decision and Ireland's ability to remain
 aloof from the conflict. During Cremin's first conversation with Salazar, in December 1945, the
 Portuguese President of the Council stated that de Valera 'must be a very able man to have succeeded in
 keeping you out of the conflict', considering Ireland's geographical position and its status within the
 Commonwealth. He was greatly impressed, moreover, by the number of Irishmen who had fought for
 Great Britain. Cremin to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs (DEA), 21 Dec. 1945,
 Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 313/11 A, National Archives (NA), Dublin,
 6 There is an entire file among the DFA Lisbon papers devoted to a single incident - E.i/22,
 United States request for withdrawal of Axis representatives in Ireland.
 7 For a discussion on the limits of the vocational movement in Ireland, see Keogh, Ireland, 76-7
 8 Richard S. Devane, 'The Religious Revival Under Salazar: Religion Restored to the Schools',
 Irish Ecclesiastical Review, 51 (1938), 20.
 9 Devane, 'Religious Revival', 35.
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 who base their politics on Christian principles, his work must seem wholly
 admirable.'10
 This level of praise was continued in conservative publications well into the war.
 Ireland and Portugal were, after 1939, bound together by a neutrality which seemed
 to reflect a growing identity of values (clearly present in the idealised vision of their
 respective countries as rural idylls held by Salazar and de Valera) and to promise an
 increased moral authority for both states in a postwar world. John M. Ryan, writing
 in the Irish Monthly of January 1940, denied that Portugal was a totalitarian state: the
 corporative system had been created by the government, but its continued
 dependence on the executive for direction was not desired by Salazar, who
 controlled 'the most honest, the wisest, the most balanced dictatorship in Europe',11
 and who wanted to see the system regulate itself. For Ryan, Salazar's secret was his
 ability to understand and evaluate the merits of the often contradictory claims made
 by employers, workers and consumers, working to resolve them according to the
 true national interest. Ryan also reminded his readership that the New State was an
 experiment, corporativism in Portugal having been created in a piecemeal fashion
 with the state acting as a foster-mother 'that encourages every sign of self-control
 and self-discipline manifested by its fostering'.12 The differences between Salazar
 and Mussolini on issues such as totalitarianism, and the use of violence by the state,
 had already been the subject of an article by another Jesuit, Thomas O'Donnell, in
 Studies.13
 A third Jesuit, W. P. MacDonagh, established a contrast between Salazar and the
 age he was living in, 'whose greatest art is the advertisement'.14 Despite his many
 triumphs, MacDonagh stated, Salazar refused to publicise his actions, which, all told,
 entailed the sudden reversal of four hundred years of decline in Portugal which had
 been accentuated by an unfortunate experience of liberalism that 'had brought the
 country to ruin'. In this article MacDonagh trod ground familiar to Irish readers: the
 dismal record of the Portuguese First Republic (1910-26), Salazar's financial
 wizardry and a description of the institutions of the revolutionary New State, whose
 corporativism was state-imposed, and thus artificial, for very good reasons: 'A new
 system had to be imposed on a people whose whole development was stunted and
 far from normal.'15 The already mentioned Ryan, in February 1941, praised
 Portugal's wartime actions, which included a strengthening of ties with the Holy
 See, the maintenance of a neutrality respected by all belligerents and the proud
 celebration of the historic 'double centenary' (1140 being considered the birth of
 Portugal and 1640 being the recovery of independence from Spain), 'an affirmation
 10 Michael Derrick, 'Portugal and Salazar', Dublin Review, 403 (October 1937), 271-85. Derrick
 was the author of a larger work on Salazar entitled Salazar of Portugal.
 11 John M. Ryan, 'Is Portugal Totalitarian?', Irish Monthly, Jan. 1940, 5.
 12 Ryan, 'Portugal', 7.
 13 Thomas J. O'Donnell, SJ, 'Salazar and the New State of Portugal', Studies, 25 (1936) 131-44.
 14 W. P. MacDonagh, SJ, 'A Professor in Politics: Salazar and the Regeneration of Portugal', Irish
 Monthly, Aug. 1940, 417.
 15 MacDonagh, 'Professor', 425.
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 of Portugal's greatness and a stressing of her immense contribution to civilisation'.16
 Significantly, Ryan lamented the absence of an official Irish presence at the
 celebrations. The centenary celebrations were also the subject of an article by
 Thomas O'Donnell, who chose to concentrate on their religious significance: in
 May 1940 a Concordat was signed between Portugal and the Holy See, to the
 delight of the Irish writer. O'Donnell finished the article with a quotation from the
 pope: 'The Lord has given to Portugal a chief who has won for himself the love of
 his people, especially of his poorer people, and the respect of the whole world. All
 credit to him.'17
 Perhaps the most significant of these laudatory pieces on the New State was a
 lecture delivered by yet another Jesuit, P. J. Gannon, entitled 'Salazar and his work',
 which was distributed to his cabinet colleagues by the Minister for Industry and
 Commerce, Sean MacEntee, in March 1940. Gannon was a clear convert to the
 New State, from which, he said, there was much to learn: 'Portugal has the honour
 of presenting us at the moment with the most successful attempt yet made to solve
 the problems which are troubling all peoples simultaneously and menacing our very
 civilisation'.18 Salazar, according to Gannon, seemed to have discovered 'the way
 out of the labyrinth in which we all just now seem hopelessly lost'. Gannon's
 evaluation of Salazar's achievements was typical: a description of the condition in
 which Portugal found itself as a result of the constitutional chaos of the Republic,
 with forty governments and sixteen revolutions in sixteen years of government by
 'gangsters' that led to a 'horror of parliamentary democracy'; a biography of Salazar,
 showing how, by 1928, 'there was no hope' for Portugal 'save him'; and finally a list
 of his triumphs, with an explanation of the workings of the new institutions. At the
 heart of these were the corporations, which grouped all who worked in a given
 industry. These vertical associations were founded on the belief that 'the class-war is
 an idiotic, as well as wicked, proposition, because it undermines the prosperity of
 the whole industry'. Corporations also reduced competition to a minimum.
 Gannon thought the system ideally suited for Portugal, having only one fault:
 although based on Catholic principles, Salazar's regime was being built on
 quicksand, for the Portuguese, after decades of masonic-liberal rule, had been de
 christianised, and the process of their reconversion had not yet begun in earnest. He
 added, however, that Salazar was undoubtedly aware of this contradiction and
 would soon resolve it. As for Ireland, there was no need to abandon its democratic
 nature, which suited it well. However, corporativism could not be ignored. Its
 advantages seemed endless and its application to Ireland was desirable: 'Beginning
 with homes, it aims at making the country one home, one harmonious house-hold,
 not rent, in the name of liberty, into so many millions of unco-ordinated (sic)
 beings very like ants when their hive is destroyed'. Democracy, argued Gannon
 despite his earlier reference to the Irish case, was perfect in theory but imperfect in
 practice, and Salazar was working on the best alternative to it so far devised: 'it may
 16 John Ryan, 'Catholic Portugal in 1940', Irish Monthly, Feb. 1941, 71.
 17 Thomas O'Donnell, SJ, 'Portugal: A double centenary', Studies, 30 (1941), 272.
 18 'Salazar and his work', Department of the Taioseach S 11601A, NA, Dublin.
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 be the via media of the future: it, or some modification of it dictated by the
 environment, tradition, needs and character of the various peoples.'19
 A number of key factors concerning the New State and its corporative face were
 absent from these favourable articles. The fact that the New State was a repressive
 regime which, defended by the armed forces and a secret police (the Police for the
 Vigilance and Defence of the State, or PVDE), sent political prisoners into exile or
 to the Tarrafal camp in Cabo Verde was not, of course, mentioned. The New State
 benefited in this respect from the poor international record of the First Republic,
 which it had replaced, and which by 1926 had become a byword in Europe for
 disorder and political instability. Moreover, as can be expected, Salazar's presence in
 power was not an act of will on the part of a leader who had imposed himself on a
 nation, a view popular in the personality-dominated 1930s. Rather, Salazar's
 elevation was the result of a complex set of compromises between political,
 economic and even military groups, momentarily allied to each other in the face of
 a hostile foreign environment and domestic enemies. Portuguese corporativism was
 not, for industrialists, latifundist estate-owners and nationalist officers, an end in
 itself, but was rather the means by which to attain a number of objectives, many of
 which, notably the repression of the urban and rural working class, were in fact in
 opposition to the ideals of the vocational movement in Ireland. Even for Salazar,
 some historians have argued, corporativism was an ideological flag of convenience,
 allowing him to enjoy foreign adulation and an undeserved reputation as a socially
 aware reformer.20 The New State existed above all to protect order, by force if
 necessary, and to provide a fa?ade of legality, legitimacy and modernity while
 articulating the interests of its supporters. It used Catholicism, nationalism and
 colonialism as mobilising forces through which to build a mass following, while a
 spiralling bureaucracy kept the lower middle class employed. Salazar's commitment
 to the wellbeing of the Church in Portugal clouded the judgement of these Irish
 commentators, whose articles and lectures, as we shall see, were not based on first
 hand observations.
 As Ireland debated the merits of a vocational reorganisation of its political and
 economic life, the example of Portugal's New State was paraded before its populace
 as a shining example of what corporativism had to offer. It is worth noting that, as
 Dermot Keogh has pointed out, these defenders of Salazar's regime spoke without
 fear of contradiction, because no-one else - not even the state - was in a position to
 obtain information about what was going on in Portugal.21 Father Gannon had
 asked 'those responsible for building up the New Ireland' to keep a close eye on
 developments in Portugal.22 Irish interest in the New State was a reality, and was
 19 Ibid.
 20 See, for example, Tom Gallagher, Portugal: A Twentieth-century Interpretation (Manchester:
 Manchester University Press, 1983), 73-4.
 21 Keogh, Ireland, 112. Keogh returns to this point later in the same work: 'Salazar's Portugal had
 exercised a strong influence over many Irish advocates of vocationalism in the 1930s. The absence of
 Irish diplomatic representation in Lisbon, until mid-1942 [sic], left the government without sustained
 political reporting on the development of the corporate system there'. Keogh, Ireland, 174-5.
 22 Gallagher, Portugal, 73-4.
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 clearly reflected in Eamon de Valera's very first communication to Salazar proposing
 the establishment of an Irish legation in Lisbon, dated 27 August 1941: 'The Irish
 Government has watched with sympathy and admiration the great work of re
 construction which you have carried out in Portugal and, naturally, it wishes to
 observe it more closely.'23 Announcing his decision to open the legation in Lisbon
 to D?il Eireann, de Valera, the Taoiseach and Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated
 that 'we have all heard of the great advances which Portugal has made' under the
 leadership of Salazar, mentioning as well 'the progressive and Christian outlook of
 the Portuguese Government in handling its economic and other domestic prob
 lems'. This outlook had, according to de Valera, 'attracted attention and admiration
 throughout the world and, not least I think, in this country'.24 This did not mean
 that de Valera himself was a supporter of corporative ideologies. He could not,
 however, be seen to break openly with them either. As J. J. Lee puts it, de Valera
 'could hardly publicly denounce an ideology commended by the papacy'.25 The
 possibility of an Axis victory in Europe might also mean the sudden need to
 refashion Irish politics along corporative lines. Colm O'Donovan certainly under
 stood the observation of the workings of the New State to be a part of his brief. As
 he met Salazar for the first time, O'Donovan stressed the Irish government's interest
 in Salazar's reforms, being assured by Salazar ? who, like de Valera, was both Prime
 Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (and also, until September 1944, Minister
 of War) - that all government departments would provide the Irish legation with
 the information required to allow O'Donovan to carry out his mission. Even during
 his first round of meetings, however, the Irish charg? d'affaires could see that not all
 was well in the way in which Portugal was governed. One of his very first
 conclusions about Portugal was that power was unusually centralised in the hands of
 Salazar. 'I get the impression', he wrote, 'that decisions on all matters, even of no
 special importance, are made at the top.'26 In this he was absolutely correct. Salazar
 shunned cabinet meetings, preferring to meet individually with the other members
 of his government,27 and by the end of the war, there were, within the Ministry for
 Foreign Affairs, no junior ministers, no secretary general, and no directors general:
 below Salazar there was a large administrative gap until the heads of service were
 reached. O'Donovan's early interlocutors stressed that the social and economic
 difficulties caused by the war were making the New State's existence more difficult,
 and should be taken into account, but among these contacts the regime had some
 bitter critics. One unnamed Portuguese religious figure told O'Donovan that 'we
 [the Irish] 'had nothing to learn here, that there was no country in the world where
 there was so much poverty'.28 Other diplomats had described Salazar's task as
 23 De Valera to Salazar, 27 Aug. 1941, DFA 317/40.
 24 'Draft Statement for Minister', 1 Dec. 1941, DFA 317/40.
 25 J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 272.
 26 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 4 Mar. 1942, DFA 219/81.
 27 Gallagher, Portugal, 66.
 28 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 4 Mar. 1942, DFA 219/81. According to one contemporary
 source, Portuguese per capita income in 1941 stood at one half that of Ireland and one third that of
 Great Britain. George O'Brien, 'The Financial Policy of Dr. Salazar', Studies, Vol.30 (1941), 358. The
This content downloaded from 78.18.65.11 on Tue, 19 May 2020 11:11:35 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 398  Contemporary European History
 'hopeless', because of the lack of'good lieutenants' and the 'remarkable backward
 ness' of Portugal.29
 Over his three years in Portugal O'Donovan would warn Dublin that the New
 State was not in any conceivable way a model to follow. This was not because of
 the dictatorial and repressive nature of the regime, rarely mentioned in
 O'Donovan's correspondence. What struck the Irish representative most was the
 New State's inability, through a mix of inefficiency and corruption, to cope with
 the most pressing problems affecting Portugal - notably poverty and its causes.
 O'Donovan concluded from his observations that not all the protagonists in the
 New State viewed the regime as a genuine attempt to establish a new political
 organisation; rather, it was the case that overt support for Salazar permitted a series
 of covert frauds which debased the principles upon which the New State was
 founded. The most obvious problem for the Portuguese was the lack of food in
 wartime. This was not a new problem. Portugal had long been in the paradoxical
 position of being an agricultural country unable to feed itself30 The agricultural
 character of the country was being deliberately preserved by Salazar, wary of an
 industrial development which might corrupt moral values the dictator believed to
 be intrinsic to the Portuguese. Salazar, moreover, refused to countenance any
 notion of agricultural reform, even one which, like the break-up of the southern
 latifundia estates, might increase production. The inviolability of land ownership
 was assured under the New State. The Second World War aggravated the food
 shortages, which in peacetime could be overcome through imports.
 O'Donovan was amazed to find that rationing was not in place when he first
 arrived in Lisbon. Rationing of essential supplies had been well understood, in the
 First World War, to be essential in the maintenance of good domestic morale,
 through the creation of the idea that all, whatever their wealth, were making equal
 sacrifices.31 In Portugal, rationing had not been introduced during the First World
 War, and the resulting social strife had been considerable.32 The New State,
 however, felt sufficiently confident in its production and distribution arrangements
 not to introduce rationing. Salazar's government predicted that the country could
 produce enough to feed itself and see to it that this produce reached the consumer.
 This, at least, was the message O'Donovan received when he first enquired about
 the rationing of essential goods such as bread, flour, eggs and sugar.33 On 15 January
 1943, O'Donovan described the mechanics of the distribution of essential goods
 Apostolic Nuncio was in agreement with this Portuguese priest. See O'Donovan to Secretary, 8 May
 1942, DFA, Secretary's Office P 12/9, as well as Keogh, Ireland, 174-5.
 29 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 8 May 1942, DFA, Secretary's Office P 12/9.
 30 In this, thus, Portugal differed totally from Ireland. As J. J. Lee has written, Ireland, during the
 war, 'had the good fortune to be, for practical purposes, self-sufficient in food'. Lee, Ireland 1912?198$,
 234.
 32 See, for example, John Home, ed., State, Society and Mobilization in Europe During the First World
 War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
 32 See Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, Unido Sagrada e Sidonismo: Portugal em Guerra, 1916?1918 (Lisbon:
 Cosmos, 2000).
 33 O'Donovan to Dr Paula Brito, MNE, 1 Oct. 1942, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files about Portugal
 6/10.
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 (which, at the time, were held to comprise sugar, salt cod, rice and pasta). This was
 to take place through the joint effort of the co-operative organisations (gremios) of
 wholesalers and of retailers, working to quotas fixed on the basis of 1940 levels of
 consumption. The system was based on the notion that there would be enough to
 eat if foodstuffs were properly distributed and smuggling to Spain did not take place.
 Very quickly the system was shown to be inadequate: by June 1943 the Irish legation
 was being informed of the introduction of orthodox rationing measures, and in
 October O'Donovan received the first ration cards, which related to the purchase of
 bread.34 Ration cards for other products would follow as the war continued, but the
 damage had already been done. The problems the New State's reputation faced
 during the war was summed up in February 1946 by the interim charg? d'affaires,
 C. C. Cremin: whereas the gremios controlled 'all supplies in their particular branch
 of business', they had not ensured that prices were kept 'within reasonable limits';
 moreover, the existence and action of the gremios had not done away with the black
 market, where all products could be found at a much higher price than that set by
 the gremios. As the Irish diplomat explained, 'the inference drawn (logically on the
 premises) is that those in the "Gremios" are exploiting the organisation for their
 personal profit'.35
 In September 1943 O'Donovan described the state of apprehension and doubt
 that was gripping Lisbon, stressing the importance of the supplies question and the
 inadequacy of the government's response: 'There have been many arrests and
 punishments of firms found to have been hoarding but these measures, though
 popular, do not tackle the root of the problem, which lies in the failure of the
 Government to introduce an effective system of rationing.'36 If something serious
 was not done soon, O'Donovan warned, the food situation would provoke 'more
 serious disorders in the future'. The introduction of rationing did not resolve the
 food shortages because of the corruption which permeated the corporative organisa
 tion in the country. There were also allegations that foodstuffs were indeed being
 exported, at premium prices, to the Axis powers. The monarchist newspaper A Voz
 criticised the working of the gremios in January 1945, in an article which attracted
 the attention of the Department of External Affairs.37 Sending a translation of the
 article, O'Donovan pointed out that
 it is hardly necessary to add that press criticism of the corporative organisations on general or
 fundamental grounds would not be permitted by the authorities here. But the public outcry
 against the unefficiency [sic] and corruption of the 'Gremios' and certain official organisations
 during the present emergency was on such a scale that it was doubtless thought wise to assent
 to the limited criticism contained in these articles.38
 In his final report, in February 1945, O'Donovan contrasted the privations under
 gone by Portuguese workers, whose bread ration was down to 300 g. per day, with
 34 Notice received from the MNE Protocol, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/10.
 35 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 19 Feb. 1946, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/6.
 36 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 20 Sep. 1943, DFA 219/81.
 37 Secretary, DEA, to charg? d'affaires, Lisbon, 7 Jan. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/6.
 38 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 19 Jan. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/6.
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 the 'very easy' life of 'those who have money'.39 This corruption and its
 demoralising effects also provided the basis of a report sent by Patrick J. O'Byrne,
 the secretary of the legation, on 5 March 1945. What disappeared from the official
 channels of distribution, O'Byrne pointed out, turned up in other ways; in the case
 of potatoes, 'it seems phenomenal how, in presence of acute shortage, large sacks of
 them come to light from no one knows where to be sold under the noses of the
 authorities in the city of Lisbon itself at fancy prices'. To the Irish diplomat, it was
 clear that 'the lucky person with money to spend can obtain a sack with little
 difficulty at a price which is 70-90 per cent above the official rate'.40 Three months
 later, O'Byrne claimed that the whole food distribution system was 'a long-standing
 joke with the public'.41 The impression made on Irish observers of the New State
 by this most basic of failures was poor indeed, and it would be compounded by
 other obvious faults, leaving O'Donovan and his colleagues with the worst of
 opinions regarding the New State and its possible replication in Ireland.
 As can be expected, the crisis of foodstuffs led to social unrest. This, for the New
 State, was especially embarrassing, because Salazar's greatest achievement, as
 perceived at the time both at home and abroad, was the restoration of order to
 Portugal: political order, exemplified by the longevity of his cabinets, and order in
 the streets, achieved by the banning of political parties and independent trade unions
 and the arrest or exile of political opponents. Organised protests revealed to
 observers that workers did not see in the existing corporative arrangements a fair
 and just mechanism by which to resolve their problems, resorting instead to
 traditional - but now illegal - forms of protest. Occasionally these protests had
 direct implications for Ireland: a dock workers' strike in November 1942 threatened
 the smooth operation of Irish Shipping Ltd in Lisbon, and news of the event quickly
 made its way through Irish government departments.42 In February 1943 Salazar
 was forced to adopt extreme measures in order to maintain the smooth running of
 vital sectors of the economy. All workers in the fields of war materials, postal,
 telegraph and telephone services, transport, mining, energy, ports and naval
 construction, chemicals and vital food processing plants were made subject to the
 possibility of militarisation of their activity. What this potentially meant was the
 sudden introduction of military discipline in the workplace and the subsequent
 elevation of strike activity to miHtary desertion. In June that year these draconian
 powers were first used against coal miners, although O'Donovan was not able to
 identify the circumstances as a result of which such a drastic step had been taken.43
 These measures were not in themselves sufficient to restore calm, and another tack
 was soon taken - that of momentary appeasement through wage increases.
 39 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 22 Feb. 1945, DFA 313/11.
 40 O'Byrne to Secretary, DEA, 5 Mar. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/10.
 41 O'Byrne to Secretary, DEA, 1 Jun. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/10. According to
 Fernando Rosas, all of the solutions adopted by the government - including rationing - served only to
 increase bureaucracy through the proliferation of 'institutes' and 'regulating commissions'. Fernando
 Rosas (coordinator), Portugal e o Estado Novo (1930-1960) (Lisbon: Editorial Presen?a, 1992J, 321.
 42 Boland to Leydon and Flynn, 9 Nov. 1942, DFA 219/81.
 43 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 16 Jun. 1943, DFA 219/81.
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 O'Donovan reported in January 1944 that a 20 per cent increase had been approved
 in relation to the salaries of civil servants, the military and local authorities. The
 reason for this sudden generosity was, according to the Irish diplomat, fear of open
 revolt by troops weary of seeing their quality of life worsen through inflation and
 the black market. In O'Donovan's words, 'these concessions were wrung from the
 government virtually at the point of a pistol, the twice repeated rioting and strikes of
 the past twelve months and open revolt among the troops in the Azores having
 forced them to take action'.44 O'Donovan saw in this course a reluctance to face up
 to the real problems affecting the country, and suggested that the sudden increase in
 wages would inevitably be matched by an increase in prices: but, he warned, 'there
 will undoubtedly be further unrest if something effective is not done to keep down
 the prices'.45
 Another source of complaint from O'Donovan was the corruption and ineffi
 ciency of the lowly paid civil service, which matched that of the gremios. In May
 1943, for example, he blamed the inability to provide a detailed report on economic
 and social conditions, as requested by Dublin, on the fact that 'the collection of
 necessary data has been much delayed by the slowness of the departments
 concerned'.46 On another occasion O'Donovan mentioned the frustration felt by
 foreign correspondents stationed in Lisbon, who complained about the length of
 time needed to obtain the official permission to transmit their dispatches. As
 O'Donovan put it, 'it would seem to be largely a question of the incorrigible
 dilatoriness normal to Government offices here' clashing with the journalistic desire
 for speed.47 When he left Portugal O'Donovan was even more blunt: 'The war is of
 course the great alibi of the authorities in regard to everything that is amiss but I
 think it cannot be doubted that a very large part of the difficulties arises from the
 system.'48 Every question that arose was disputed by competing agencies, each
 proposing a different course of action 'so that endless time is lost in conferences and
 arguments and nothing is done'. For the common citizen, the only way to negotiate
 the system was to bribe systematically the badly paid public officials who stood in
 the way of a desired end 'in order to reduce the unconscionable delays that would
 otherwise ensue'. The result was a long string of prosecutions for these irregularities
 among traders, civil servants and officials in the gremios, which, however, failed to
 put an end to corruption.
 Another example of the lack of initiative and drive to be found in the New State,
 according to O'Donovan, was the Uni?o Nacional. This was the political move
 ment that was meant to embody and mobilise public support for the New State and
 the 'national revolution' it was supposedly carrying out. Because of Salazar's avowed
 anti-totalitarianism and the regime's elitism, however, it had no clear role to play.
 Unlike a democratic party, the Uni?o Nacional had no grassroots and no ability
 44 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 8 Jan. 1944, DFA 219/81.
 45 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 8 Jan. 1944, DFA 219/81.
 46 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 13 May 1943, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/3.
 47 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 21 Dec. 1943, DFA 233/301.
 48 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 22 Feb. 1945, DFA 313/11.
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 to generate policy, and unlike the Fascist and Nazi parties membership was not a
 prerequisite for high office. In a country ruled by a professor, it was the university
 that supplied the governing cadres of the New State. From within the Uni?o
 Nacional appeared the deputies to the National Assembly, who essentially rubber
 stamped the government's legislation, and during the Spanish Civil War the Uni?o
 Nacional obtained permission to form an armed militia, the Legi?o Portuguesa, whose
 role was monitored and restricted by a jealous army. In January 1944, O'Donovan
 reported that the Uni?o Nacional, which for the past ten years had been essentially a
 'dead letter', was to host a congress to debate some of the burning domestic,
 colonial, and international issues of the day.49 Such an event was to be a part of a
 new drive in Portuguese political life, and the sudden awakening of the party might
 be interpreted as a desire to give the regime a less dictatorial aspect in the wake of
 the Azores agreement (which allowed the Allies to use the Lajes airfield), itself made
 possible only by Salazar's belief that an Allied victory was now assured. As the
 congress neared, however, O'Donovan's scepticism grew: 'it seems now to be the
 general view in circles which should know what is going on that the Congress will
 be more or less devoted to window dressing.'50 For all the press coverage of the
 work of the various committees, it seemed clear to O'Donovan that 'nothing of
 great consequence will emerge from the Congress'.51 This is not surprising,
 considering the emasculated role played by the Uni?o Nacional in Portuguese
 politics. Moreover, the Uni?o Nacional seemed incapable in 1944 even of
 performing its most basic function - that of associating eminent men with the
 regime: 'I have heard of a number of cases in which people who had been invited to
 speak or present papers had, through lack of interest, declined to do so.'52
 O'Donovan duly sent Dublin the congress resolutions in June 1944 but cast cold
 water on their importance, claiming that for all the attention focused by the press on
 the congress 'before and especially during its session', the public had never really
 warmed to its debates: the Portuguese, in fact, had followed much more closely the
 unfolding events in Normandy, where the fate of the continent was being
 decided.53 Although a new course was indeed set for the regime at this time, as we
 shall see, it was the end of the war - and the Allies' victory ? which determined the
 change.
 The only branch of government whose efficiency was admired by Colm
 O'Donovan was the Propaganda Secretariat. Beginning with a discussion of a book
 published by F. C. C. Egerton, which praised Salazar and the New State without
 any real criticism, O'Donovan reflected on how little independent writing on
 49 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 8 Jan. 1944, DFA 219/81.
 50 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 31 Mar. 1944, DFA 219/81.
 51 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 31 Mar. 1944, DFA 219/81.
 52 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 31 Mar. 1944, DFA 219/81.
 53 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 9 Jun. 1944, DFA 219/81. According to Fernando Rosas, 'the
 Uni?o Nacional continued to exist as a mere electoral support for the regime, an organism devoid of its
 own political life, which was reactivated or agitated . . . whenever such reactivation or agitation was
 convenient to the interests and objectives of those in power, and in particular served the strategy and
 tactics of Oliveira Salazar in order to ensure both the strengthening of his personal power and, above all,
 the continuity of the regime'. Rosas, Portugal e o Estado Novo, 54.
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 Portugal had actually been carried out. The Portuguese state, according to the Irish
 charg? d'affaires, was incredibly successful at promoting favourable articles and
 books whose facts were taken directly from Propaganda Secretariat publications.
 'For instance', he explained, 'none of the writers of articles on Portugal in Irish
 periodicals appears to have any direct personal knowledge of Portugal.'
 O'Donovan's views on this trend were clear: no great harm would come from the
 usual Irish authors writing in praise of Salazar, 'but unfortunately they sometimes
 appear to write in favour of a system of government of the workings of which they
 know nothing'.54 During the war, favourable pieces on the subject of the New State
 continued to appear in Ireland's conservative publications, written by the usual
 authors, who ignored, deliberately or otherwise, the difficulties Portugal was
 experiencing.55 As far as O'Donovan was concerned, this lack of rigour when
 writing about Portugal was dangerous because of the discussion in Ireland
 concerning vocational organisation. In November 1944 O'Donovan sent a strong
 letter to Dublin complaining of not having been consulted by the Committee on
 Vocational Organisation (established by de Valera in 1938), whose report, published
 in August ofthat year, he had just read, and in which it was stated that the war had
 made it impossible to obtain official information from Portugal concerning its
 corporative institutions. The legation's very existence rendered false such a
 statement. O'Donovan's conclusion was especially damning in relation to the New
 State: Irish censorship should prevent the publication of the by now usual articles
 that praised the Portuguese regime without carrying out a critical evaluation of its
 achievements.56 He added:
 I cannot claim that I am competent to pass judgement on the system but I know enough to
 be perturbed that a public opinion in favour of this type of corporativism should be allowed
 to be created by persons of apparently no special competence at the time when the whole
 question was, as it were, subjudice at home and had certainly not emerged from the trial stage
 here.57
 54 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 8 Jan. 1944, DFA 219/81. See also Memorandum for the
 Government (Department of Finance) Department of the Taoiseach S 11601A, which details the
 economic and financial policy of Portugal. As its authors readily and naively admit, 'the following
 quotations are taken from statements by Dr. Salazar . . . and from articles in the official bulletin,
 "Portugal", issued in English and French editions by the Portuguese Secretariat of National
 Propaganda'. The lack of rigour and hard facts when dealing with Portugal had already been identified
 by one of the regular contributors to Studies, Edward J. Coyne, in a review article in 1939: 'Portugal is
 still very much in the news in Catholic circles, judging by the number of new books and long articles
 published almost monthly. Yet of concrete, detailed and useful information about the political and
 economic life of present-day Portugal there is very little in English. There is practically nothing that is
 of sufficient critical and well-informed quality to enable one to judge the success or failure of Salazar's
 efforts in the various departments of social, economic and political life.' Coyne, book review, Studies, 28
 (1939), 168-70.
 55 See, for example, John M. Ryan, 'Portuguese Corporativism Now', Irish Monthly, March 1944.
 56 According to Dermot Keogh, the Commission on Vocational Organisation's report was badly
 received by politicians and civil servants, and made little impact as a result of both their criticisms and
 the Second World War, caused, after all, by many of the countries whose workings were covered by
 the report. Keogh, Ireland, 176.
 57 O'Donovan to Secretary, DEA, 27 Nov. 1944, DFA 219/81.
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 That the New State was still in a trial phase was demonstrated by the fact that the
 corporations, independent bodies regulating a specific industry, had not yet been
 created, despite the many claims to the contrary which, incredibly, had been
 published in Ireland.58 Moreover, O'Donovan argued, it was possible to separate
 Salazar from this failed experiment: 'Salazar's main achievements, which are in the
 spheres of financial internal order, public works, and international affairs, have
 nothing whatever to do with the corporative system.'59 O'Donovan urged the Irish
 government to heed his warning when taking any decision relating to vocational
 organisation and corporativism in general.60 He was even more critical of the
 system's viability in his final report from Portugal: 'It does not appear to have taken
 root as one might expect it to have after ten years of trial if it was a healthy plant.'
 The idea that the corporations could exist without the strong state's support was
 false, and even the Corporative Chamber - the consultative upper house of
 parliament, supposedly representative of the economic interests of the country - was
 made up essentially of'professors, lawyers and members of the learned professions',
 reflecting thus the failure of the whole experiment. The strength of O'Donovan's
 reaction to the report on vocational organisation suggests that at least in some official
 circles the transformation of Irish political life to suit the possibility of a German
 dominated Europe had been discussed.
 There was, of course, another set of reasons for O'Donovan's doubts about the
 New State's long-term prospects. Although not as closely related to the Axis powers
 as Franco, Salazar, as a dictator, was undoubtedly on the defensive as the Second
 World War's outcome became increasingly predictable. A war against fascism and
 dictatorship was being won, and the activity of the democratic opposition within
 Portugal was increasing with the expectation that no longer would any European
 dictatorships be tolerated. The first mention that the regime's future was question
 able as a result of the war's course came in 1943, when Mussolini was cast aside by
 both the Fascist party and the king of Italy. According to O'Donovan, this piece of
 news 'was received here with great satisfaction by the populace, probably because of
 the prospect it seemed to offer of the shortening of the war rather than because of
 any effect that it might be thought to have on the regime here'.61 That the
 government was ill at ease with the news and the intense discussions it provoked 'in
 the streets, trams, caf?s etc.', however, was shown by the fact that 'caf?s and bars'
 had been forced to close early by the police on two successive nights and by the
 strident tone of the pro-Salazar press. The Diario da Manhd, rightly taken by
 O'Donovan to be the mouthpiece of the government, fooled nobody by its strident
 proclamation that 'we Portuguese, at least among Europeans, have the best reasons
 58 The corporations were only created in 1956, by which time, as Tom Gallagher points out,
 'almost all the impetus had gone out of the corporative revolution'. What had existed in their place
 were the 'state-run agencies known as Organisations of Economic Co-ordination'. Gallagher, Portugal,
 73
 59 Ibid.
 60 In this he was not alone. For the political and official response to the report, see Lee, Ireland
 1912-1985, 275-7.
 61 O'Donovan to DEA, 29 Jul. 1943, DFA 219/81.
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 of any people for receiving with serenity the departure of the Fascist chief'.62 A
 telegram sent in October 1944 spoke of the foreboding with which the Portuguese
 authorities viewed the destruction of Germany and Russia's victory.63 As the war
 came to an end, and the Allied powers began to put pressure on Franco to quit his
 position in Spain, speculation was rife in Lisbon over whether or not Salazar could
 survive the forced removal of the Spanish Caudillo. There is plenty of evidence in
 the Irish diplomatic archives of the pressures that Salazar was coming under at the
 time of the end of the war. Describing the way in which V-E Day was celebrated in
 Lisbon, O'Byrne mentioned the size of the crowds and the way the Western Allies'
 flags - symbols of a longed-for democracy ? were enthusiastically waved by the
 population.64 The situation worsened as the Labour Party came to power in Britain,
 a development which hinted at a hardening of attitudes against Franco,65 and as the
 Potsdam communiqu?, which included a harsh indictment of Franco, was pub
 lished.66 It is interesting to note that these events were not held to pose a direct
 threat to Salazar, but rather only an indirect danger via the possibility of a change of
 government in Spain.67 C. C. Cremin, describing his first round of meetings with
 other colleagues in Lisbon, passed on the views of the Danish minister, who had
 been in Lisbon since 1941: 'some kind of trouble in Spain is inevitable and . . .
 developments there could not but fail to have a direct influence' in Lisbon.68
 On 22 February 1945, as we have seen, O'Donovan related the contents of his
 final round of meetings in Portugal. He began with his meeting with Salazar. Once
 again the Irish charg? d'affaires brought up de Valera's interest in Portugal's
 corporative experiment, this time in order to obtain Salazar's own views on its
 results. According to the dictator, the war was hampering the development of the
 system, having prevented, for example, the creation of the corporations. Asked what
 the greatest difficulties he had so far encountered had been, Salazar replied,
 according to O'Donovan, that 'the greatest danger we have encountered has been
 the monopolistic tendency of the organisations', which obstructed the appearance
 and development of rival enterprises. In other words employers, united in the
 gremios, used their official connections and status to stifle any competition. It was
 significant, according to O'Donovan, that Salazar had replied with the word
 'dangers' to a question that mentioned only 'difficulties'. Other entities, not
 surprisingly, were more pessimistic than Salazar. Cardinal Cerejeira, head of the
 Roman Catholic Church in Portugal, expressed his concern both for the continued
 62 O'Donovan to DEA, 29 Jul. 1943, DFA 219/81.
 63 O'Donovan to DEA, 23 Oct. 1944, DFA, Secretary's Office P 12/9.
 64 O'Byrne to Secretary, DEA, 5 Jun. 1945, DFA 313/11.
 65 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 2 Aug. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/5. See also Cremin to
 Secretary, 30 Sep. 1945, DFA, Secretary's Office p 12/9.
 66 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 11 Aug. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/5.
 67 The view held by foreign diplomats in Portugal was that whatever course Spain followed would
 be replicated soon thereafter in Portugal. Thus, if Spain succumbed to communism, the Portuguese
 Communist Party would capture power; but if Spain managed a transition to a parliamentary monarchy,
 then the same could take place in Portugal as well. See, for example, Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 21
 Sep. 1945, DFA 313/11.
 68 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 23 Aug. 1945, DFA 313/11.
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 poverty in Portugal and the high levels of corruption; from his careful phrasing
 O'Donovan inferred that 'he [the Cardinal] implied that the trouble might be
 inherent in the system'. Cerejeira also reflected on the inability of the corporative
 organisations to stand on their own two feet, as Salazar had originally intended. The
 reason advanced by the prelate was the absence of trained individuals not in the
 employment of the state. The harshest of all verdicts was, however, passed by the
 apostolic nuncio: 'He regarded the corporative state in Portugal as a camouflage and
 all imposture and holds out that it will collapse without Salazar.' Moreover, 'it had
 not "caught on" with the people, on whom it was imposed by force', and 'it had
 nothing in common with the ideals behind the encyclicals, despite propaganda
 claims in that direction'. The nuncio urged O'Donovan to encourage the British
 Foreign Office to intervene in Portugal if it wanted to save Salazar and the country
 from a violent revolution. The seriousness with which such a warning, coming
 from the Vatican's diplomatic service, was received in Dublin should not be
 underestimated - and this report, the culmination of O'Donovan's work in
 Portugal, was clearly meant as the final nail in the coffin of the New State's
 respectability and value as a model for adoption in Ireland.
 Doubts about the survival of the regime did not mean that Irish diplomats -
 O'Donovan and his successors - looked with satisfaction at the prospect of Salazar
 falling from power. To the Irish, and to other foreign commentators, Salazar was
 indeed the saviour of Portugal, even if the men who surrounded him were not of
 the same calibre. Leading opposition figures were either unequivocally linked with
 the First Republic (being former politicians or their sons) or tainted with the
 communist brush. With the war coming to an end, Salazar announced the intention
 of revising electoral procedures and permitting elections 'as free as those in free
 England'. Cremin was sure that the new international climate was behind this
 move, and wondered how the regime could cope with the existence of a permanent
 opposition: once tolerated, and applauded by some abroad ? those whom Cremin,
 with some disdain, collectively described as 'foreign "democratic" criticism' ? the
 opposition in Portugal could not be easily suppressed. These elections were
 scheduled, by decree of 6 October 1945, for 18 November that year.69
 An electoral contest then developed between the sluggish Uni?o Nacional and an
 69 On 7 Oct. 1945 an article appeared in the Observer claiming that Salazar's moves should not 'be
 taken as indicating a revival of democracy in the Peninsula, for in Portugal, as in Spain, elections do not
 count for much ... In the last six years the regime has adopted the worst features of Nazism and
 Fascism, with a Gestapo, political persecutions, deportations, political prisons, secret prisons, rigid
 censorship, and absolute control of the Press.' Cremin, commenting on the article, stated that it did not
 take into account the latest electoral legislation, adding laconically, 'it is clear that the writer does not
 like the system here and consequently tends to exaggerate certain aspects of it; but there is no doubt a
 fundamental justification for his criticism if one starts from the viewpoint that all non-democratic
 systems are condemned without justification.' Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 11 Oct. 1945, DFA, Embassy
 Lisbon, Files 6/14. The following day Cremin sent a brief telegram following a conversation with the
 British ambassador, an Irishman named O'Malley. According to the ambassador, the Observer article had
 probably been written 'by Jew named Deutscher', and O'Malley had written to the Foreign Office 'to
 say this type of article harmful and spoils atmosphere required for his business'.
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 opposition coalition, the Movimento de Uni?o Democr?tica (MUD).70 In the
 MUD were ranged all political opposition forces, from anarchists and the Portu
 guese Communist Party to the republicans ousted in 1926 and their followers. Press
 restrictions were momentarily lifted, one newspaper in particular, A Rep?blica,
 becoming quite openly the mouthpiece of the MUD.71 Just before the election,
 however, the MUD called on its supporters to boycott the poll, exasperated by the
 government's actions, which included the refusal to prolong the campaign period,
 the refusal to allow for a new period of voter registration (essential, as the MUD saw
 it, because for over ten years of dictatorship only Salazar's supporters had deigned to
 register),72 and the violent seizure of lists of MUD supporters by the PVDE. This
 move allowed for the full weight of repressive measures to be quietly applied to
 those who had become involved in the MUD at any level. All of these machinations
 were observed by the Irish diplomats, but no condemnation was made. In fact,
 Cremin seems to have been unduly harsh on the MUD, judging it by standards
 applicable to an opposition in a parliamentary democracy. He wrote, in one
 instance, 'the opposition has not hitherto come forward with anything in the
 manner of a positive programme. Briefly stated, their programme is the restoration
 of individual liberty and the abolition of certain features of the present regime - the
 'gremios' and corporative system generally, and all measures restricting individual
 freedoms.'73 It is clear from such a programme that the MUD merely wanted to
 remove Salazar and the New State in order to restore parliamentary democracy,
 before breaking up into its constituent parts; but so great was the lack of faith in
 Portuguese politicians' ability to work such a system that Cremin unfairly preferred
 to focus on the movement's lack of concrete policies. Against this he contrasted the
 'excellent record' of the government 'in the spheres of finance, public works,
 foreign affairs and internal political stability'.74 The duality of treatment continued
 in Cremin's assessment of the strength of support for the MUD, which, he initially
 estimated, had the potential to become a strong opposition, 'particularly among the
 classes subject to foreign ideas and influence' and among the 'lower classes (whose
 lot has not been markedly improved by the "New State")'.75 Some time later
 Cremin, who like other observers was at a loss to understand why Salazar had
 decided upon the holding of the elections in the first place, reported that both
 Salazar and the opposition leaders themselves were surprised at the MUD's strength,
 Salazar feeling 'that he is the victim of gross ingratitude'.76
 70 The MUD's initial manifesto was essentially concerned with the running of the elections, calling
 as it did for total freedom of the press, of assembly and of propaganda, an amnesty for all political
 prisoners, an equal share in the process of electoral registration, a presence in the voting areas and the
 ability to supervise the count.
 71 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 13 Oct. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/14.
 72 A recent estimate is that only 12 per cent of the population was registered to vote. Rosas, Portugal
 e o Estado Novo, 58.
 73 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 19 Oct. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/14.
 74 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 19 Oct. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/14.
 75 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 19 Oct. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/14.
 76 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 10 Nov. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/14.
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 The Uni?o Nacional duly won the elections after the MUD's early withdrawal,
 providing all 120 deputies for the National Assembly, with 60 per cent of the
 electorate, according to official sources, having participated in what had become
 essentially a plebiscite. Cremin, while stating that there was 'no way of measuring
 the validity of the figures', contradicted himself by arguing that the figures showed
 that the opposition had no ground for the claim, made during the campaign, that it
 had 50 per cent of the Lisbon electorate on its side.77 Similar partiality would mark
 the coverage of the 1949 presidential elections by another Irish diplomat, Count
 O'Kelly de Gallagh.
 With the war over, the very reasons which had led to the legation's establishment
 disappeared: normal trade conditions and the freedom of movement were slowly
 restored in western Europe, and censorship was lifted, while the dream of a high
 moral authority to be enjoyed by the neutral nations dissipated in the face of an
 absolute victory by one of the contending parties. Ireland and Portugal dealt with
 the new diplomatic reality in different ways, which, not surprisingly, considering
 the very different nature of their respective neutralities, saw their paths diverge.
 What the correspondence from the legation in Lisbon makes clear, however - apart
 from the real economic significance that Portugal held for Ireland during the war -
 is that the very great attraction that the New State once held for Irish eyes faded
 significantly through close observation by Colm O'Donovan and his colleagues.
 Corruption, inefficiency and poverty were terms now indelibly attached to the
 picture official Ireland had of Portugal. This did not mean that approval of Salazar's
 actions had vanished; it was still very much in place, for the New State continued to
 provide a bastion of stability, order, Catholicism and anti-communism. Even
 Portugal's colonialist stance was not yet a hindrance to Irish?Portuguese relations.
 Nevertheless, the New State was no longer seen as a pioneering regime, capable of
 presenting Ireland with a new way forward and a successful solution to the problems
 of the age.
 77 Cremin to Secretary, DEA, 24 Nov. 1945, DFA, Embassy Lisbon, Files 6/14. Fernando Rosas
 calls the MUD the 'biggest organised and mass movement against the New State that the opposition
 created during the existence of the regime toppled on 25 April 1974'. Rosas, Portugal e o Estado Novo,
 59
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